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The Demise of Arbitration Agreements in
Long-Term Care Contracts
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few decades, the use of pre-dispute binding arbitration provi-
sions in a wide array of consumer contracts has increased exponentially.
One of the industries that has seen a particularly significant increase in the
use of arbitration agreements is the nursing home industry. In fact, individu-
als entering nursing homes and the families of those individuals will more
likely than not come across these clauses when signing contracts of admission
with long-term care providers.2 While the use of arbitration agreements has
traditionally been supported by the United States Congress, most state legisla-
tures, and the judiciary, the use of these provisions in the context of nursing
home contracts has been the subject of great debate over the past ten years.
The prospect of arbitration is very appealing to those in the nursing
home business. Through the eyes of the industry, arbitration is a logical and
cost-effective means of resolving future claims between nursing homes and
individuals residing in the facilities. By including these clauses in their con-
tracts, nursing home administrators claim that they are avoiding exorbitant
damage awards by juries.4 The facilities are also discouraging future clai-
mants from filing suit against them.5 However, mandatory pre-dispute arbi-
tration clauses may not be so helpful to nursing home residents. More and
1. Arbitration is an alternative form of dispute resolution, in which an arbitra-
tor, generally a neutral third party, "conducts an information gathering process, which
may include document exchange, briefing and testimony of witnesses" and renders a
decision on the issue. STEVEN C. BENNETT, EsQ., ARBITRATION: EssENTIAL
CONCEPTS 4-5 (2002). Additionally, the decision handed down by the arbitrator dur-
ing an arbitration is "generally binding on the parties ..... Id. at 5. In effect, a con-
tract that contains a binding arbitration provision prevents potential plaintiffs from
having suits heard in a court of law.
2. See Nathan Koppel, Nursing Homes, in Bid to Cut Costs, Prod Patients to
Forgo Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Apr. I1, 2008, at A l, available at http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB I 20786025242805879.html.
3. See generally Amy Parise DeLaney, Maneuvering the Labyrinth of Long-
Term Care Admissions Contracts, 4 NAT'L ACAD. ELDER L. ATTY's J. 35, 57 (2008).
4. Koppel, supra note 2.
5. Id
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more frequently, people seeking the assistance and shelter of a long-term care
facility are forgoing their rights to have future disputes against care providers
heard by a judge or jury, simply because they have no choice. Nursing home
admission contracts are offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis, and incoming
residents either sign the agreements or are not admitted to the nursing home.6
This proves to be particularly troubling when one considers the vulnerable
condition most people are in when entering nursing homes and signing the
agreements.
The decision to enter a long-term care facility is not an easy one for po-
tential residents, nor is it an easy decision for their families. In signing a
long-term care admission contract containing a compulsory arbitration provi-
sion, people are often unknowingly relinquishing their rights to hold that fa-
cility accountable in the unfortunate circumstance that the nursing home fails
to provide adequate care for the patient.7
This Article argues that pre-dispute compulsory arbitration provisions in
nursing home contracts should not be enforced and encourages the elimina-
tion of such clauses in long-term care contracts. This Article will lay out the
historical background and development of arbitration and then will address
the use of arbitration clauses in nursing home admission contracts. Finally,
this Article will explore recent developments of arbitration law in long-term
care contracts, both federally and in the state of Missouri, with particular
attention given to the Supreme Court of Missouri's decision in Lawrence v.
Beverly Manor.9
6. id.
7. See generally DeLaney, supra note 3.
8. It should be noted that this Article does not assert that arbitration in and of
itself is bad. Quite the contrary, arbitration is a proper and beneficial means of dis-
pute resolution in many circumstances. See, e.g., Robert J. Landry, Ill & Benjamin
Hardy, Mandatory Pre-Employment Arbitration Agreements: The Scattering, Smo-
thering, and Covering of Employee Rights, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 479, 483
(2008) (noting the benefits associated with arbitration provisions in employment con-
tracts). Additionally, many individuals and businesses prefer arbitration because of
the privacy affiliated with the process and the technical knowledge of the arbitrators.
See BENNETT, supra note 1, at 6-7. However, arbitration provisions in nursing home
admission contracts are not beneficial to incoming nursing home residents, as the
provisions normally favor the nursing home entity; they are therefore inappropriate in
the nursing home context. See discussion infra Part IV.
9. 273 S.W.3d 525 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
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A. Historical Background ofArbitration &
the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
Historically, the judiciary was very critical of arbitration agreements.' 0
The courts' disfavor of such agreements emanated from English common law
and was reflective of the English courts' disapproval of pre-dispute binding
arbitration." However, arbitration provisions became increasingly popular in
the beginning of the twentieth century,12 and the United States Congress put
an end to the early condemnation of these agreements by adopting the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA).'
10. JON 0. SHIMABUKURO, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: BACKGROUND AND
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ORDER CODE RL 30934,
available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-3879:1.
11. Id.; see also David P. Pierce, Comment, The Federal Arbitration Act: Con-
flicting Interpretations of Its Scope, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 623,625 (1992).
12. In fact, some have labeled the prominence of arbitration provisions during
this era as "in vogue." Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The
Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1305 (1985). See also IAN
R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 15 (1992) ("[A]t the turn of the century,
arbitration was neither a new nor an uncommon practice in the United States .... ).
In the more recent past - particularly during the 1990s - arbitration provisions be-
came increasingly prevalent in a wide array of contracts. See generally Preston
Douglas Wigner, Comment, The United States Supreme Court 's Expansive Approach
to the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of Section 2,
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1995).
13. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). This piece of legislation was originally entitled the
"United States Arbitration Act," but it is more commonly known as the "Federal Ar-
bitration Act" and will be referred to as the FAA for purposes of this Article. As a
side note, the FAA has been touted as the "single most important element of modem
American arbitration law and policy." BENNETT, supra note 1, at 17.
Prior to the enactment of the FAA, federal and state courts did not take a uniform
approach with regards to enforcing arbitration. MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 21. In-
stead, arbitration law was a somewhat unorganized compilation of English common
law, state case law, and federal case law. Id. While some states had statutes on the
matter, it seems that the statutes were inapposite to the federal courts and were like-
wise not uniformly applied in the state court systems. Id. It should be noted that the
federal law that existed on the subject "was largely in accord with the views common-
ly prevailing in the state courts and legislatures at the time . . . ." Id. at 21-22. Never-
theless, there were still disputes as to whether federal or state law should govern. Id.
at 22. Consequently, in the early years of the twentieth century, the desire for the
creation of a uniform body of law began to emerge. A movement in New York that
spanned from 1911 to 1920 sparked the thought of reforming arbitration law at the
federal level. Id. at 25-28. In 1920, the New York State legislature enacted the 1920
New York Act, which gave New York courts authority to enforce binding pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. Id at 34-35. Following the passage of the New York Act, arbitra-
2010] 183
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The FAA expressly confirms the binding nature of arbitration agree-
ments14 and conveys Congress's support of using alternative means of dispute
resolution.1 5 The pertinent section, 9 U.S.C. § 2, provides,
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agree-
ment in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
By implementing the FAA, Congress's goal was essentially to give arbi-
tration agreements the same weight as other types of contracts.17 Additional-
ly, Congress hoped to overcome the longstanding judicial opposition to en-
forcing arbitration.'8 In looking beyond Congress's intent in implementing
the FAA, many courts have interpreted the Act as being "a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."l 9 In a
practical sense, "[t]he effect of [Section 2] is to create a body of federal sub-
stantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within
tion reformers, led by the American Bar Association, lobbied for a federal arbitration
statute similar to New York's legislation. Id. at 84. Congress responded to these
demands in 1925 with the adoption of the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 100-01.
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
15. Missouri courts have noted that "[t]he FAA expresses the United States Con-
gress's policy favoring resolution of disputes by enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments, instead of resorting to the judicial system." Kansas City Urology v. United
Healthcare Servs., 261 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
17. SHIMABUKURO, supra note 10, at 2.
18. Sue Van Sant Palmer, Lender Liability and Arbitration: Preserving the Fab-
ric ofRelationship, 42 VAND. L. REv. 947, 952 (1989). In addition, Palmer described
Congress's intent by addressing the House Report that provided as follows:
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law. ...
[B]ecause of the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction,
they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate. . . . This jealousy
survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded
in the English common law and was adopted with it by the American
courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to
be overturned without legislative enactment, although they have frequent-
ly criticized the rule ....
Id. at 952 n.36 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)).
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the coverage of the Act."20 The Supreme Court of the United States, in an
apparent effort to eliminate any chance that the objective of Congress in
adopting the FAA be misconstrued, also has noted that
[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law,
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be re-
solved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.21
Ultimately, the enactment of the FAA transformed the approach of both
the federal and state court systems when addressing controversies involving
pre-dispute binding arbitration clauses.22
B. Arbitration Law & Long-Term Care Contracts
Many issues arise with respect to arbitration clauses in long-term care
contracts, and there are consequently several matters that one should consider
when confronted with such provisions. This Section will discuss which laws
- federal or state - govern arbitration, the growth of arbitration clauses in
nursing home contracts, and challenging the validity of such clauses under
both common law and state statutory law.
1. Issue of Preemption: FAA or State Law?
As previously mentioned, no uniform body of law governed arbitration
prior to the enactment of the FAA.23 Different states took various approaches
to the matter, and these approaches were rarely consistent with each other.24
One of the goals of the federal legislation was to remedy these inconsistencies
by establishing a uniform law on arbitration. 25 Following the adoption of the
FAA, courts had to consider which law to apply to arbitration contests filed in
state courts - the existing state statutes or the new federal law. The question
therefore became, and still remains, whether the FAA is applicable to arbitra-
tion agreement disputes in both the federal and state court systems.
20. Id
21. Id. at 24-25.
22. In reaction to the federal statute, many state legislatures reconsidered existing
arbitration laws and revised their legislation. BENNETT, supra note 1, at 4-5.
23. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
24. MACNEIL, supra note 12, at 25 ("[The laws on arbitration] were hardly in
universal harmony, and the law of some states certainly differed in significant re-
spects from the law of other states, even without the intervention of statutes.").
25. See discussion supra Part II.A.
2010] 185
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The FAA was enacted under the authority granted to Congress by the
Commerce Clause26 and is therefore a "body of substantive law [that] is en-
forceable in both state and federal courts." 27 Preemption thus becomes a ma-
28jor concern to the states enacting their own arbitration statutes, and the FAA
has been found to preempt state law in most circumstances. 29 However, the
Supreme Court has recognized that a state may implement legislation con-
cerning arbitration agreements that governs general standards of contract law,
such as "validity, revocability, and enforceability. . . ."3o Additionally, "gen-
erally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionabili-
ty, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening
§ 2."3 State law will therefore apply to arbitration agreements on certain
issues. In conjunction with the idea that state law governs cases addressing
the violation of the basic principles of contract, there has been a boom in liti-
gation regarding arbitration clauses in state courts over the past decade. 32
This is particularly noticeable in disputes involving long-term care con-
tracts.33
Within the past several years, nursing homes have substantially in-
creased their use of arbitration provisions in the contracts provided to resi-
dents entering their facilities. 34 The question of whether these arbitration
agreements are governed by federal or state law can arise whenever a suit
challenging one of these clauses is filed in a state court. The FAA validates
any "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbi-
tration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction." 35
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keat-
ing, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984)).
28. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that federal law
preempts state law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
29. BENNETT, supra note 1, at 18 ("Under the doctrine of 'preemption,' if an
arbitration is governed by the FAA (essentially all contracts affecting interstate com-
merce), state courts must apply the FAA, even when a state statute might otherwise
command a different result.").
30. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996) (quoting
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)).
31. Id. at 687.
32. F. Paul Bland, Jr. et al., Selected Arbitration Decisions Since April 2008,
1728 PRAC. L. INST. CORP. L. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 839, 841 (2009) (not-
ing that "more than 500 new judicial opinions" on the topic of binding arbitration
agreements have been passed down "in the last two years alone").
33. Suzanne M. Scheller, Arbitrating Wrongful Death Claims for Nursing Home
Patients: What is Wrong With This Picture and How to Make It "More" Right, 13
PENN. ST. L. REV. 527, 530 (2008); see also DeLaney, supra note 3.
34. Scheller, supra note 33, at 530. Some have attributed the rise in challenges
to arbitration provisions contained in nursing home contracts to the increase in wrong-
ful death suits, which have tripled in the past four years. Id.
35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
186 [Vol. 75
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If the FAA is to govern the arbitration agreement, the agreement must involve
commerce. 36 That leads to the question of whether a nursing home contract is
considered a "transaction involving commerce" so as to be covered by the
federal statute. In most situations, the answer is yes. The FAA typically will
govern these arbitration agreements, as "courts have generally held nursing
home contracts to be transactions involving 'interstate commerce."' 37 How-
ever, if the claim is one involving the violation of general contract principles,
the FAA will not govern, and the court will apply state law.38
2. Rapid Growth of Arbitration in Nursing Home Contracts
As noted above, binding arbitration has become the norm in long-term
care admission contracts. Some believe that there are "substantive advan-
tages" for a nursing home to have cases heard before an arbitrator, as opposed
40to a judge or jury. Unsurprisingly, one of the advantages cited is the "lack
of publicity associated with arbitrated cases."4' Arbitration is a private pro-
ceeding; the process is closed to the public, and the decisions are unpublished
42
and are only given to the parties involved in the dispute. This is beneficial
to the nursing home industry because people will not be deterred from enter-
ing nursing homes based on the media's reporting of substandard care pro-
vided by the facilities. Additional advantages purportedly include the avoid-
ance of litigation costs and large damage awards given by emotional juries.4 3
These agreements have also been credited as furthering judicial efficiency
because they are removing cases that would typically be heard in a court and
putting them before an arbitrator." For many of these reasons, long-term
care providers have found safe haven in these proceedings and therefore re-
quire entering residents to commit to future arbitration.
3. Challenging the Validity of Mandatory Arbitration - Case Law
When confronted with a dispute involving an arbitration provision in a
nursing home contract, the court typically engages in a two-part test to deter-
36. Id.
37. Scheller, supra note 33, at 536.
38. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
39. See supra Part 1.
40. DeLaney, supra note 3.
41. Id
42. BENNETT, supra note 1, at 6.
43. Koppel, supra note 2. It is generally thought that damage awards in arbitra-
tion are lower than in litigation because the agreements may include damage limita-
tions.
44. Landry, supra note 8.
2010] 187
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mine the applicability of the FAA to the particular agreement.45 First, the
court establishes that the arbitration provision is, in and of itself, valid and
binding on both parties.46 Second, the court determines that "the specific
dispute falls within the scope of that agreement."4 7 The majority of chal-
lenges to the enforcement of arbitration agreements falls under the first part
of the test. 48 Typically, these claims assert some sort of contract defense as to
why the parties should not be bound by the arbitration provisions, such as
unconscionability or the signatories' lack of authority.49
Since an arbitration provision is part of a contract, typical contract prin-
ciples govern the agreement, and a person cannot be compelled to arbitrate
unless he has consented to do so.50 However, most people entering nursing
homes are not in a condition to understand the terms of a contract, nor are
they physically or mentally capable of signing the document. Consequently,
nursing homes frequently allow the entering patient's family members to sign
these provisions, even if the family members do not have the authority to do
so and the resident does not have the capacity to consent to the signing. 1 The
signatory's lack of authority may thus be a cause for challenging the arbitra-
tion provision. In deciding these types of cases, courts have developed many
different reasons as to why arbitration should or should not be enforced.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has concluded
that a nursing home resident who was a non-signatory to the admission con-
tract may still be bound by the arbitration clause when it is signed by a third
party, even if it appears that the third party did not have the legal authority to
do so. 52 In J.P. Morgan & Chase Co. v. Conegie, the nursing home resident
had a disease that caused "severe physical and neurological problems, includ-
ing dementia psychosis." 5 3 The resident's mother signed the admission con-
tract on her behalf, but it was not clear that she had the legal authority to do
so.54 In fact, the lower court found that she had no such authority. Howev-
45. Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., Inc., 31 F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir. 1994). If
the FAA is not applicable, state law will likely govern the suit. See discussion supra
Part II.B.I.
46. Houlihan, 31 F.3d at 694-95.
47. Id. at 695.
48. Scheller, supra note 33, at 534.
49. This means that state law will typically govern these disputes, and the re-
mainder of this Part will assume that the FAA is inapplicable.
50. W. Todd Harvey, Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home Admission Con-
tracts: Are Nursing Home Residents and Their Assignees Bound by Mandatory Arbi-
tration Agreements? Not Necessarily, 39 J.T.L.A. TRIAL 72, 73 (2003).
51. Id; see also ERIC. M. CARLSON, LONG TERM CARE ADVOCACY § 3.06 (2006).
52. JP Morgan & Chase Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 598, 600 (5th
Cir. 2007).
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er, the appellate court determined that the patient, who ordinarily would lack
the capacity to contract based upon her mental condition, was still bound by
the arbitration provision in her nursing home admission contract, even though
she was not a signatory to the contract, because her mother had signed on her
behalf.s The majority analyzed the case under both federal and state law,
determining that the choice of law was irrelevant because arbitration was
commanded under both forms. The court ultimately concluded that arbitra-
tion was warranted under state law because, in accordance with the state's
family consent statute, the patient lacked the capacity to bind herself to the
contract, and her mother could therefore sign on her behalf,58 or, alternative-
ly, that it was warranted under federal law because the patient had the capaci-
ty to consent to her mother's signing of the contract - binding her as an enter-
ing resident to the terms of the provision. 59
Unlike Mississippi, California has no family consent statute and has
therefore arrived at a different conclusion. In Pagarigan v. Libby Care Cen-
ter, Inc., the court concluded that lack of capacity on the part of a nursing
home resident to authorize a third party to sign an admission contract vitiated
any claim that the resident was bound by the terms signed by the third party.o
In Pagarigan, a nursing home resident's daughter signed the admission con-
tract on her behalf because the resident was not mentally competent at the
time she entered the facility and could therefore not sign the agreement her-
self.61 The court determined that the nursing home patient "lacked the ca-
pacity to authorize [her] daughter to enter into the arbitration agreements on
55. Id. The district court concluded that there was not an "agency relationship"
between the mother and patient and therefore determined that the arbitration agree-
ment was unenforceable. Id. at 598.
56. The court applied the two-part test referenced above and analyzed the case
under both federal law and Mississippi state law. Id.
57. Id.
58. In arriving at this conclusion, the court applied Mississippi's family consent
statute, which provides that a family member "may make a health care decision for a
patient who is an adult . .. if the patient has been determined by the primary physician
to lack capacity ..... Id at 599 (quoting Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-211). Under this
statute, a parent may make health care decisions for an incapacitated individual. Id.
As interpreted by this court, this statute includes the decision to enter into a nursing
home. Id. Statutes such as Mississippi's are known as family consent statutes or
"family decisionmaking statutes." See generally 2 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE
249 (2d ed. 1995). It should be noted that, while many states have implemented simi-
lar statutes, not all of them have. Id.
59. Conegie, 492 F.3d at 599-600. In any event, it is relatively unclear how,
under state law, one can be found to lack the capacity to consent to a contract, so as to
warrant the finding that a third party can bind another to the agreement, when, in the
exact same situation under federal law, a person has the capacity to consent to be
bound to a contract.
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her behalf' and that the daughter therefore had no authority to bind the pa-
tient to the provisions.62 Consequently, the arbitration agreements were unen-
forceable and not binding on the patient. As evidenced by these cases, lack
of authority to enter into a contract on behalf of another person is a common
defense to arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts. In correlation
with a lack of authority, unconscionability is also frequently claimed as a
defense.
Unconscionability is one of the most commonly asserted defenses to
pre-dispute binding arbitration provisions in long-term care contracts; howev-
er, courts have been reluctant to give the claim much credit.6 In order for an
unconscionability argument to stand, the provision must be found to be both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. 6Procedural unconscionabil-
ity addresses the "formation of the contract," and some describe it as being
"an absence of meaningful choice by one of the parties." 66 Unconscionability
in this sense would typically lie when there is some sort of issue with the
form of the contract, such as the arbitration provision being buried deep with-
in a document and put in tiny print, so as to render it virtually unnoticeable.
As an example, a Florida court noted that an arbitration provision in a nursing
home contract was not procedurally unconscionable when the clause was
"worded clearly, [was] conspicuous, and [was] separate from other [admis-
sions] documents."67 Additionally, procedural unconscionability has been
found where the signatory to the agreement was compelled to sign under a
"lack of voluntariness" and with "lack of knowledge" as to the terms that he
was signing.68
62. Id.
63. Id. It should be noted that the nursing home asserted two arguments as to
why arbitration should be enforced - that the daughter represented herself as "having
the power to bind" her mother to the agreement and, alternatively, that the daughter
had the authority to bind the patient "merely by being [the] mother's next of kin." Id.
at 301-02. The court rejected both of these arguments, emphasizing that the "next of
kin" concept applicable in the health care situation did not "confer authority on the
next of kin to bind a nursing home resident to an arbitration agreement ..... Id. at
303.
64. DeLaney, supra note 3, at 60.
65. See, e.g., Pleasants v. Am. Express Co., 541 F.3d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 2008);
State ex. rel Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) ("Un-
conscionability has two aspects: procedural unconscionability and substantive un-
conscionability.").
66. Scheller, supra note 33, at 549.
67. Schott v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., 988 So.2d 639, 641-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
68. Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So.2d 507, 517 (Miss. 2005) (en
banc). The Vicksburg court described the "lack of knowledge" prong as being "dem-
onstrated by a lack of understanding of the contract terms arising from inconspicuous
print or the use of complex, legalistic language, disparity in sophistication of parties,
and lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire about contract terms." Id. at
190 [Vol. 75
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Substantive unconscionability, on the other hand, arises when the "terms
. . . are unreasonably favorable to one of the parties." 69 Some courts have
found substantive unconscionability "when the arbitration agreement is . . .
oppressive." 70 This oppression might be demonstrated by one party's "depri-
vation of all of the benefits of the agreement" 71 or, alternatively, where the
terms of the agreement "serve to limit the obligations and liability of the
stronger party.'72 In comparison, a Mississippi court concluded that an arbi-
tration provision in a nursing home contract was not substantively uncon-
scionable because it did not "significantly alter [the resident's] legal rights or
severely limit the damages available to her."73 In spite of the popularity of
the defense, the claim of unconscionability with respect to arbitration provi-
sions in long-term care contracts is no longer an issue in some states, having
been supplanted by a state statute regulating the use of binding pre-dispute
arbitration in nursing home admission contracts.
4. Challenging the Validity of Mandatory Arbitration -
State Statutory Law
Illinois has enacted the Illinois Nursing Home Care Act ("the Act"),
which, among other things, governs contracts between a nursing home and its
74
residents. The Act essentially eliminates all possibility that a resident can
be forced to arbitrate claims against the nursing home, even if the resident
had the capacity to enter into such an agreement.75 Additionally, the Act
ensures that a party who wishes to file suit against a nursing home has the
right to have his claim heard in a court of law before a jury and that "any
waiver of the right to trial by jury, whether oral or in writing, prior to the
517-18. The court explained the second prong, a "lack of voluntariness," as being
"demonstrated in contracts of adhesion when there is a great imbalance in the parties'
relative bargaining power, the stronger party's terms are unnegotiable, and the weaker
party is prevented by market factors, timing or other pressures from being able to
contract with another party on more favorable terms or to refrain from contracting at
all." Id at 518.
69. Scheller, supra note 33, at 551.
70. Forest Hill Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McFarlan, 995 So. 2d 775, 785 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2008).
71. Vicksburg, 911 So.2d at 521 (citing Bank of Ind. v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp.
104, 110 (S.D. Miss. 1979)).
72. Id. (citing Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Tenn. 1996)).
73. Id.
74. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1-101 to 3A-101 (2008).
75. See id. 45/3-606 ("Any waiver by a resident or his legal representative of the
right to commence an action under Sections 3-601 through 3-607, whether oral or in
writing, shall be null and void, and without legal force or effect.").
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commencement of an action, shall be null and void, and without legal force
and effect." 7 6
Likewise, Maryland has enacted statutory provisions favorable to enter-
ing nursing home residents.77 The Maryland legislation authorizes the prom-
ulgation of regulations governing a patient's rights upon entering an "ex-
tended care" facility and helps ensure that a long-term care resident will not
be bound by an agreement to which he did not consent.78 The statute pro-
vides that "[a] facility may not require or solicit, as a condition of admission,
the signature of another person, other than the applicant, on the application or
contract of admission to the facility."7 The statute establishes two excep-
tions under which a person other than the resident may sign a contract bind-
ing the entering resident to the terms - when the entering resident has been
"adjudicated disabled" according to state statute, or where it has been deter-
mined by a doctor that he lacks capacity to contract.so This requirement es-
sentially eliminates the uncertainty discussed above in Part II.B.3 over
whether a signatory lacks authority to sign the agreement.
C. The Progression ofMissouri Arbitration Law &
Long-Term Care Contracts
1. Missouri's Uniform Arbitration Act
Missouri courts have traditionally disfavored arbitration clauses and
have not been apt to compel parties to comply with them. By the middle of
the twentieth century, similar sentiments emerged from the state legislature
and were brought to the forefront by Missouri's enactment of the Uniform
Arbitration Act of 1955 (Missouri's Act).82 Missouri's Act solidified the
76. Id. 45/3-607.
77. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH - GEN. § 19-344 (LexisNexis 2008).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 19-344(b)(1).
80. Id. § 19-344(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
81. Keith S. Bozarth, Comment, The Uniform Arbitration Act in Missouri, 46
Mo. L. REV. 627, 627-28 (1981).
82. MO. REV. STAT. § 435.010 (repealed 1980). The Missouri Act should not be
confused with the Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). See generally UNIFORM
ARBITRATION ACT (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
uarba/arbitratl2l3.htm. While Missouri's Act purported to be a uniform law, it was
not; this simply was the title adopted by the legislature. Missouri's Act had a com-
pletely different purpose than the original Uniform Arbitration Act promulgated by
NCCUSL. NCCUSL's goal in promulgating the Uniform Arbitration Act was to
"insure the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate in the face of oftentimes hostile
state law." Id. The Missouri Act was not originally supportive of arbitration. See
generally Bozarth, supra note 81, at 627-28.
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state's disapproval of binding arbitration provisions, essentially providing
that arbitration clauses did not proscribe the signatory to the agreement from
filing suit in court.83 However, over a period of three decades, arbitration
evolved into a more acceptable and prominent means of dispute resolution.
Consequently, the state legislature reacted by revisiting some outdated stat-
utes.
In 1980, the legislature made an emphatic statement in support of arbi-
tration clauses by adopting the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), which was
essentially a revised version of the 1955 Missouri Act.8 4 The UAA is a fairly
expansive law that gives credence to arbitration provisions in the majority of
contracts. Logically, this means that fewer cases will be heard in a court of
law, as the appropriate setting for challenging a contract containing a compul-
sory arbitration clause will be before an arbitrator. However, the statute gives
the court power to intervene in some situations. Specifically, the statute
83. See generally Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.010 (repealed 1980).
84. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350-.470 (2000). In adopting the UAA, the legislature
repealed the previously governing Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955. Id. This new
version of the UAA essentially aligned the Missouri statute with the original version
of the Uniform Arbitration Act as promulgated by NCCUSL in 1956, since the Uni-
form Arbitration Act as drafted by NCCUSL remained unchanged until 2000. See
UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bllI/
archives/ulc/uarbalarbitrat 1213.htm.
In 2000, NCCUSL made significant revisions to the Uniform Arbitration Law,
and these were the first major changes to the Act in more than fifty years. Timothy J.
Heinsz, Arbitration Law: Is There a RUAA in Missouri's Future?, 57 J. Mo. B. 86
(2001), available at http://www.mobar.org/journal/2001/marapr/heinsz.htm. These
changes were sparked by the boom of the use of arbitration in a variety of contracts
and the subsequent growth of litigation surrounding the agreements. Id. Missouri has
yet to adopt the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, and it is unclear whether the state
plans to do so in the future. Id.
85. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350-.470. The pertinent language of the statute pro-
vides that "[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract . . . to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter
arising between the parties is valid [and] enforceable . . . ." Id. § 435.350. The only
arbitration clauses expressly excluded from the statute's protection are ones found in
contracts of adhesion and insurance contracts. Id. It should be noted that the UAA is
similar in many respects to the FAA. Additionally, it is thought that the Missouri
legislature's primary goal in enacting the UAA was "to provide expeditious and inex-
pensive resolution of disputes without judicial involvement." l3ozarth, supra note 81,
at 630. This is one of the same goals that the United States Congress had in 1925
when the FAA was enacted. See generally Kansas City Urology, P.A. v. United
Healthcare Servs., 261 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008).
86. MO. REv. STAT. § 435.350 ("A written agreement to submit any existing
controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract . . . to submit to arbitra-
tion any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." (emphasis added)).
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will not compel arbitration in circumstances in which the validity of the arbi-
tration clause is in contention, and a court may have the discretion to rule on
these provisions in keeping with the traditional laws of contract.87
2. Arbitration Provisions in Missouri's Nursing Home Contracts
While challenges to arbitration agreements have exploded nationally
within the past several years, the challenge of the enforceability of arbitration
provisions in long-term care contracts is a fairly new issue to Missouri courts,
and prior to 2009 only two cases had been decided by the appellate courts on
88the matter. The suits that have been filed have typically arisen in the con-
text of a wrongful death claim,89 and Missouri courts have seemingly been
hesitant to enforce arbitration provisions since hearing the first challenge
brought against a long-term care facility.
The first case to be decided in Missouri on the issue was Finney v. Na-
tional Healthcare Corp.90 The Finney court was predominantly concerned
87. Id.
88. A survey of the Missouri state court cases challenging mandatory arbitration
agreements in nursing home contracts yielded only a few cases. The first case to be
heard by the Missouri Court of Appeals on the issue was Finney v. National Health-
care Corp., and the case was only recently decided in 2006. 193 S.W.3d 393 (Mo.
App. S.D. 2006).
89. On the other hand, Missouri courts have also addressed the arbitrability of
claims of personal injury to nursing home residents against the nursing home facili-
ties. See Tallmadge ex rel. Tallmadge v. Beverly Enters.-Mo., 202 S.W.3d 47 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2006). In Tallmadge, the plaintiff entered into a care facility because of
health problems. Id. at 48. The plaintiffs husband signed the nursing home contract,
which included an arbitration agreement, for his wife. Id Several months after the
signing of the contract, the plaintiff gave her husband durable power of attorney and
made him her "attorney-in-fact." Id. Subsequently, the plaintiff received injuries
allegedly due to the nursing home's negligence, and the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in-
stead of submitting the case to arbitration as the agreement provided. Id. In response,
the care facility filed a motion to compel arbitration. Id. Ultimately, the court de-
clined to enforce arbitration because the durable power of attorney had not been prop-
erly executed prior to the signing of the arbitration agreement, and it was therefore not
enforceable. Id. at 49.
90. Finney, 193 S.W.3d 393. To give a brief factual background of Finney, the
decedent (the plaintiffs mother) entered into a nursing home and had her grand-
daughter sign her admission contract (which included a compulsory arbitration provi-
sion). Id at 394. The plaintiff, the resident's daughter, did not sign the contract and
was not a party to it. Id. She filed a wrongful death suit on behalf of her mother
against the defendant nursing home. Id The defendant nursing home filed a motion
to enforce the arbitration agreement some two years after the lawsuit was com-
menced. Id. The trial court declined to enforce the arbitration provision for three
reasons: there was no case law "supporting the proposition the Missouri arbitration
statute is preempted by the Federal Act in a tort action created by statute"; the FAA
did not preempt the Missouri UAA because the contract did not involve commerce;
194 [Vol. 75
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with the enforceability of the nursing home contract itself and not the validity
of the arbitration provision contained therein.9 1 The court ultimately found
that, since the plaintiff had not signed the original agreement, she was not "a
party to the contract" and therefore was not bound by the terms of the con-
tract - including the arbitration provision.92
In the second case addressing the issue, the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Southern District, also declined to enforce arbitration provisions in nursing
home contracts. Sennett v. National Healthcare Corp. involved a wrongful
death claim filed by the son of a nursing home resident. 93 In appealing the
denial of its motion to compel arbitration, the nursing home asserted that the
Finney line of reasoning with regard to wrongful death suits was inapplicable
and that "wrongful death claims are derivative, and, therefore, are covered by
[Patient's] Arbitration Agreement." 94 The court rejected this argument and
determined that the approach taken by the Finney court governed. 95 The
court concluded that, because the plaintiff had not signed the contract in "his
individual capacity" and because he had not been appointed as his mother's
legal representative or guardian, he was not a party to the arbitration agree-
ment and was therefore not bound by it.96
In some respects, these cases illustrate Missouri's reversion back to a
pre-1980 and pre-UAA mentality toward arbitration provisions. During the
short two-year period in which these disputes were decided, the appellate
court made its disfavor of arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts
known, at least with respect to wrongful death suits.
and the arbitration provision did not contain the warning required by statute, making
the agreement unenforceable. Id. On appeal, the court did not address any of the
bases for the trial court's decision. Id.
9 1. Id.
92. Id. at 397 ("[A] nonparty to the initial agreement containing an arbitration
clause, is not bound by the clause in her independent cause of action for the wrongful
death.").
93. 272 S.W.3d 237 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008). The plaintiff signed an admission
contract including an arbitration agreement on behalf of his mother. Id. at 239-40.
94. Id. at 242. After determining that federal law was inapplicable, the court
turned to the Missouri UAA to resolve the issue. Id. at 240. The court used a two-
step test to determine whether enforcement of the arbitration provision was warranted
under the UAA and asked "whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and if so,
whether the specific dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement." Id.
(quoting Netco, Inc. v. Dunn, 194 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)).
95. Id. at 245.
96. Id at 245-46.
2010] 195
15
Bailey: Bailey: Demise of Arbitration Agreements
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
1II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Currently Pending Federal Legislation: Fairness in Nursing Home
Arbitration Act
For the majority of the twentieth century, Congress has favored arbitra-
tion as a method of dispute resolution. 97 Arbitration was seen as a means of
avoiding the expenses of litigation for all parties involved and as a way to
eliminate the possibility of exorbitant damage awards by "runaway juries." 98
In correlation with Congress's support of the provisions, the use of compul-
sory arbitration in nursing home contracts has dramatically increased and has
become practically commonplace. 99 While the use of arbitration provisions
in a majority of contracts may accomplish Congress's original goals with
regard to its implementation of the FAA, the use of the agreements in nursing
home contracts recently has been questioned on the basis of public policy.
The United States Congress is currently reevaluating the approach it
took in 1925 when it enacted the FAA and validated all arbitration agree-
ments in contracts involving commerce. Legislation has been proposed be-
fore both the House and the Senate that, if passed, would effectively ban pre-
dispute binding arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts. 00 The leg-
islation, the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009 (FNHAA),
was introduced in the House on February 26, 2009.os The bill was intro-
duced in the Senate on March 3, 2009.102
As proposed, the legislation will amend the arbitration provisions of
Title 9 of the United States Code. 0 3 The suggested amendments involve
adding provisions to 9 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3.10 Specifically, the most compel-
ling amendment falls under the "Validity and Enforcement" provision of Sec-
tion 3 and would add the following provisions to the end of the section:
97. See supra Part II.A.
98. Michael J. Lockerby, 'Fairness' Looms in New Congress, The Balance of
Power May Shift Between Parties to Arbitration, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 2008, at 13.
99. Koppel, supra note 2 (noting that, in nursing home contracts, "arbitration has
quickly become the rule rather than the exception").
100. See S. REP. NO. 110-518, at 2 (2008). The Senate Report cites the need for
this legislation as stemming in part from the rise in "substandard care" provided to
elderly residents of nursing homes and the residents' ignorance of the fact that they
have waived their rights to bring claims against said nursing homes in a court until it
is too late. Id. In addition, the Report notes that arbitration proceedings are "costly
and burdensome." Id.
101. H.R. 1237, 11 Ith Cong. (2009).
102. S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009).
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(b) A pre-dispute arbitration agreement between a long-term care
facility and a resident of a long-term care facility (or anyone acting
on behalf of such a resident, including a person with financial re-
sponsibility for that resident) shall not be valid or specifically en-
forceable.
(c) This section shall apply to any pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ment between a long-term care facility and a resident (or anyone
acting on behalf of such a resident), and shall apply to a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement entered into either at any time during
the admission process or at any time thereafter.
(d) A determination as to whether this chapter applies to an arbitra-
tion agreement described in subsection (b) shall be determined by
Federal law. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the va-
lidity or enforceability of such an agreement to arbitrate shall be
determined by the court, rather than the arbitrator, irrespective of
whether the party resisting the arbitration challenges the arbitration
agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the
contract containing such agreement. 05
Essentially, this bill proscribes nursing home facilities from including
any pre-dispute arbitration agreements in their contracts.106 If passed, this
legislation would be effective "on the date of enactment .. . and shall apply to
any dispute or claim that arises on or after such date."
0 7
Congress's main goal for the FNHAA is "to protect vulnerable nursing
home residents and their families from unwittingly agreeing to pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration, thus signing away their right to go to court." 08 Addi-
tionally, the Senate Report also reasons that "the ability of residents to hold
poorly-performing facilities publicly accountable in court for negligent care is
critical because government oversight of nursing facilities does not fully safe-
guard patient safety."' 09 In acknowledgement of the fact that amending the
longstanding FAA to prohibit nursing homes from using pre-dispute manda-
tory arbitration clauses in their contracts may seem like a radical idea, the




108. S. REP. No. 110-518, at 2 (2008).
109. Id. at 3. The Report considers several alternatives to remedying the growing
problems that arise with binding arbitration in nursing home contracts. For instance,
the Report notes that "regulating arbitration agreements [will] not mitigate the prob-
lems with pre-dispute mandatory arbitration in nursing home cases." Id at 14. In
addition, "[t]hese [types] of reforms would not be effective." Id.
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to be inadequate.110 Additionally, this legislation has the support of numer-
ous organizations and advocates for the rights of nursing home patients, such
as the American Association of Retired Persons, the American Medical Asso-
ciation, the American Bar Association, and the American Arbitration Associ-
ation."'
B. Missouri's Approach
Recently, the Supreme Court of Missouri had the opportunity to consid-
er whether pre-dispute binding arbitration clauses found in nursing home
contracts are enforceable with regard to wrongful death suits. The result may
indicate the revival of the court's disdain for compulsory arbitration agree-
ments in nursing home contracts. The court's decisions in the following
companion cases mirror the sentiments expressed by Congress in the afore-
mentioned pending federal legislation.
In Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, the court held that plaintiffs in a wrong-
ful death suit filed on behalf of a nursing home resident were not bound by
the terms of arbitration clauses in the nursing home contract.'l2 In the present
case, Mrs. Lawrence was a resident at Beverly Manor, a long-term care facili-
ty.11 3 Upon entering the facility, and because Mrs. Lawrence was unable to
do so on her own, Mrs. Lawrence's daughter, acting under power of attorney,
signed a contract on her behalf.14 The contract contained an arbitration
clause, which provided in part that "any and all claims, disputes and contro-
versies ... arising out of, or in connection with, or relating in any way to the
Admission Agreement . . . shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitra-
tion.""'5 The agreement further provided that the arbitration provision would
bind "all persons whose claim is derived through or on behalf of [Dorothy
Lawrence] .. .. 16 Subsequently, Mrs. Lawrence died, and her son filed a
wrongful death suit against Beverly Manor, asserting that his mother's death
was caused by the negligence of the facility's staff when one of its members
dropped her.117
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2-3.
112. 273 S.W.3d 525, 529 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).




117. Id The nursing home filed a motion to compel arbitration, but it was over-
ruled by the circuit court. Id. The nursing home then appealed the circuit court's
decision to the appellate court, and it was transferred to the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri. Id.
Interestingly, the Missouri Association for Trial Attorneys filed an Amicus Curiae
brief on behalf of Mrs. Lawrence. Brief of Amicus Curiae Missouri Association of
Trial Attorneys in Support of Respondent, Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d
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The issues that the court addressed were whether an arbitration agree-
ment in a nursing home contract is binding on parties seeking a wrongful
death claim and "whether a suit for wrongful death can be considered deriva-
tive of any underlying tort claims that could have been brought by the de-
ceased.""i8 The majority reasoned that a "wrongful death act creates a new
cause of action" and that such a cause of action is distinct from any claims
that the decedent might have had."' 9 Essentially, this means that the wrongful
death suit belongs to the family and not to the decedent. Therefore, "[a]
claim for wrongful death is not derivative from any claims [that] Dorothy
Lawrence might have had." 20 Had the court determined that the wrongful
death claim was derivative, the plaintiff would have been bound by the terms
of the arbitration agreement.121 Finally, the court held that arbitration agree-
ments "cannot bind parties to the wrongful death suit."' 22
The concurring judge offered a more radical reason for not enforcing the
arbitration agreement - that it was unconscionable.123 In fact, Special Judge
Norton would have held that "provisions requiring a resident and nursing
home to arbitrate any personal injury claims, and requiring them to waive
their right to have any such claims decided in a court of law, are unenforcea-
ble because they are procedurally and substantively unconscionable." 24
Judge Norton further argued that the inequality of bargaining power between
the individual and the nursing home, as a "large company," renders the
agreement unconscionable.125 Significantly, this argument is the first to come
525 (2009) (No. 89291), 2008 WL 3852924. The Amicus Brief notes that "the issues
presented by this case are of vital importance and interest to others besides the imme-
diate parties." Id. at *4. The brief dramatically adds that "[a]llowing the enforcement
of an arbitration clause for the wrongful death of Dorothy Lawrence would strip Mis-
souri citizens . . . of their rights to trial by jury." Id.
118. Lawrence, 273 S.W.3d at 527.
119. Id The court applied the reasoning established by Finney v. National
Healthcare Corp. Id. at 528.
120. Id. at 529.
121. A cause of action for the wrongful death of a person belongs to the family
and not to the decedent. Essentially, if the decedent is the only one who signed the
admission contract containing an arbitration provision, or if someone signed on the
decedent's behalf, it cannot bind future wrongful death claimants.
122. Lawrence, 273 S.W.3d at 529.
123. Id. at 530 (Norton, S.J., concurring).
124. Id. It should be noted that this concurrence does not set forth controlling
precedent on Missouri courts. However, it may be a foreshadowing of the fate of pre-
dispute binding arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts in Missouri. Addi-
tionally, the concurrence has rattled some Missouri practitioners defending nursing
homes in such disputes. See Allison Retka, Missouri Supreme Court Delivers Blow to
Arbitration Agreements, MO. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 19, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
7508522.
125. Lawrence, 273 S.W.3d at 532 (Norton, S.J., concurring). Additional reason-
ing for unconscionability provided in the concurring opinion explained that "the pro-
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from the Supreme Court of Missouri to present the notion of the unconscion-
able nature of arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts.
In a companion case, Ward v. National Healthcare Corp., the court fur-
thered its analysis of pre-dispute binding arbitration in nursing home con-
tracts and reaffirmed the holding from Lawrence.126 The court addressed this
case separately from Lawrence because of some slight factual differences
between the two cases.127 The Ward decision hinged on the issue of the lack
of authority of a third-party signatory to bind a nursing home resident to an
arbitration agreement in an admission contract.128 The resident's daughter
signed the nursing home contract on her mother's behalf and indicated on the
document that she was her mother's "Legal Representative." 29 However, the
daughter did not actually have "legally binding" authority to act as her
"mother's agent."l 30 The court ultimately determined that, since the phrase
"legal representative" was included in the arbitration provision that was
signed by the nursing home resident's daughter, this indicated that she was
actually signing on behalf of her mother and not "in her [own] individual
capacity or on her own behalf . . . .",'1 Additionally, the court held that the
plaintiffs signature was not legally binding, and, therefore, it did not render
visions of the arbitration agreement that require the Nursing Home and Resident to
arbitrate any personal injury claims, and require the parties to waive their right to
have any such claims decided in a court of law, are both procedurally and substantive-
ly unconscionable." Id.
126. 275 S.W.3d 236 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
127. See generally id at 237. A brief factual background of Ward may be helpful.
Similar to the situation in Lawrence, the plaintiffs mother was placed in the defen-
dant nursing home. Id. at 236. One of her daughters signed the contract admitting the
patient into the home, and this contract contained an arbitration agreement. Id Sub-
sequently, the plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant for the wrongful death of her
mother. Id. As was the situation in Lawrence, the nursing home moved to enforce
the arbitration, but the trial court declined to do so. Id
On appeal, the nursing home argued that "[t]he plain language of the [arbitration]
Agreement states that Respondent's claims ... are subject to arbitration." Appellants'
Brief at *8, Ward v. Nat'l Healthcare Corp., 275 S.W.3d 236 (Mo. 2009) (No. SC
89392), 2007 WL 4723279. Additionally, the defendant asserted that the arbitration
provision was not an unconscionable agreement. Id. at *11.
The court's analysis in Ward is quite succinct and is less than two pages. 237
S.W.3d 236. The court noted that the main difference between the facts in this case
and the facts in Lawrence is that both the nursing home resident's daughter and the
resident signed the admission contract containing the arbitration clause and that "[t]he
signature line under [daughter's] name indicates that [she] signed as [her mother's]
'Legal Representative."' Id. at 237.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The daughter was "not an attorney, nor was she her mother's guardian,
nor had she been given durable power of attorney or any other legally binding status
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the arbitration agreement enforceable.' 32 This opinion merely reiterated the
Missouri court's desire to change its approach to pre-dispute binding arbitra-
tion provisions in nursing home contracts and avoid the enforcement of such
clauses.
IV. DIscussIoN
For nearly one hundred years, courts treated arbitration provisions with
admiration, elevating them to a status that towered over an individual's
rights.'33 Both at the state and federal levels, the plain language of an arbitra-
tion provision consistently prevailed in the battle between the helpless and
injured plaintiff and the corporation seeking to compel arbitration.134 Such
deference has proven to be particularly troublesome in terms of compulsory
arbitration agreements in long-term care contracts.
The FNHAA recently introduced in Congress encapsulates much of the
country's current disgust with compelling arbitration agreements in cases in
which a nursing home resident has been severely harmed by the failure of the
facility to provide adequate care. 13 If passed, the FNHAA would be ex-
tremely beneficial for entering nursing home residents and would ensure that
residents retain their right to be heard in a court of law. Additionally, the
decisions delivered by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Lawrence and Ward
are positive departures from the outdated deferential mentality toward the use
of arbitration provisions in long-term care contracts.'3 However, while Mis-
souri's newfound approach to mandatory nursing home arbitration is a step in
the right direction, Missouri courts have only addressed the validity of arbi-
tration agreements in wrongful death suits.' 37 Consequently, the question of
the enforceability of a nursing home admission contract's pre-dispute binding
arbitration provision in other contexts remains unanswered, leaving a gap for
those filing suit against the nursing home for reasons other than wrongful
death. Furthermore, the Lawrence majority neglected to address many com-
pelling reasons as to why such provisions should be banned from nursing
home agreements altogether.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, or, alternatively, the Missouri legisla-
ture, needs to reconsider the validity of arbitration provisions in long-term
care contracts on a broader level. Missouri should take heed of the nation-
132. Id.
133. See supra Part II.A.
134. See supra Part II.A-C.
135. S. REP. No. 110-518, at 2-3 (2008).
136. See generally supra Part Ill.B.
137. The court based its holding on the notion that a wrongful death claim is com-
pletely separate from and not derivative of any claim that could have potentially been
brought by the resident, and, for that reason, arbitration was unenforceable. Lawrence
v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 529 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). The court did not
extend its holding to reach other potential claims of nursing home residents. See id.
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wide change in attitude toward nursing home arbitration, consider the un-
conscionability and possible economic illogicality of the provisions, and do
away with the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in admission contracts
altogether. At the national level, Congress also should consider the public
policy and economic aspects of arbitration in nursing home admission agree-
ments and pass the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act. 38
A. Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home Admission Contracts Are
Unconscionable Contracts ofAdhesion & Are Inherently Unfair to
Entering Residents
As stated in the concurring opinion in Lawrence, "provisions requiring a
... nursing home to arbitrate any personal injury claims, and requiring them
to waive their right to have any such claims decided in a court of law, [should
be] unenforceable because they are procedurally and substantively uncon-
scionable."' 39 The Lawrence majority should have aligned itself with the
concurring opinion and held nursing home arbitration agreements to be unen-
forceable on the basis of unconscionability.
Missouri courts have defined unconscionability as an agreement that "no
man in his senses and not under delusion would make, on the one hand, and
... no honest and fair man would accept on the other." 40 While some courts
have been reluctant to invalidate arbitration agreements on the basis of un-
conscionability,141 one should give significant weight to the fact that these
agreements are, more often than not, procedurally unconscionable. People
entering nursing homes often do so under the burden of severe physical or
mental afflictions and, unfortunately, may not have family or friends to help
them through the admissions process.142 It is unlikely that these people will
be able to fully understand the ramifications of signing a contract containing a
binding arbitration provision.143 This means that they will be inadvertently
forgoing their rights to have any future claims against their care providers
heard by a jury, and they will remain uninformed of this fact until it is too
late. Additionally, it has been noted that "admissions personnel themselves
138. It should be noted that, if the FNHAA were to pass, it would likely preempt
all state laws on the issue and thus may eliminate the need for Missouri to amend its
laws. However, the likelihood that the FNHAA will pass is relatively unclear. In
recognizing the uncertainty accompanying the proposed federal legislation, the re-
mainder of this Article will proceed on the belief that Missouri should adopt an alter-
native plan to remedy the issues caused by arbitration provisions in long-term care
contracts, in the event that the federal legislation is not adopted.
139. Lawrence, 273 S.W.3d at 530 (Norton, S.J., concurring).
140. Smith v. Kriska, 113 S.W.3d 293, 298 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003).
141. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
142. S. REP. No. 110-518, at 5-6 (2008).
143. Id. at 6.
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do not understand or cannot explain the details of arbitration." 1" If these
provisions cannot be explained to entering nursing home residents by the
people forcing them to sign the agreements, they should not be valid.
Correlating with this notion of unconscionability is the idea of the un-
equal bargaining power of the parties and the notion that these agreements are
contracts of adhesion. This was also mentioned in the Lawrence concur-
rence.145 Arbitration provisions in nursing home contracts are offered on a
"take-it-or-leave-it" basis 46 and are typically part of form contracts.147 The
agreements are entered into under the demands of the nursing home: sign the
agreement, or don't stay here. There is therefore "high pressure" on a poten-
tial nursing home resident to sign the admission contract immediately, and the
terms of the contracts are practically never fully explained to the signatories
to the agreement.148 As such, they are contracts of adhesion - the residents
being bound are hardly consenting to the agreements on a voluntary basis.149
Missouri statutory law specifically provides that arbitration agreements in
contracts of adhesion are not enforceable.15 0 In keeping with the current Mis-
souri law, the Lawrence court should have determined that the arbitration
provisions were invalid on the basis that they were contracts of adhesion.
Additionally, the arbitration process itself is inherently unfair for the
nursing home resident. More often than not, the nursing home selects the
arbitrator to rule over the arbitration.' 5 ' Unsurprisingly, rulings in arbitration
typically bode well for the business, or nursing home; arbitration typically
results in lower damage awards than litigation, and the arbitrator is often very
familiar with the business/nursing home, as it is frequently subject to arbitra-
tion.152 This familiarity, known to some as the "repeat-player advantage,"
144. Id.
145. Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 532 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)
(Norton, S.J., concurring).
146. Koppel, supra note 2.
147. See generally Lawrence, 273 S.W.3d at 532 (Norton, SJ., concurring) (not-
ing that contracts of adhesion "are often form contracts" and that the nursing home
contract's "arbitration agreement is a contract of adhesion").
148. DeLaney, supra note 3, at 40.
149. See generally Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in
Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237, 1247 (2001).
150. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (2000) ("[A] provision in a written contract, ex-
cept ... contracts of adhesion, to submit to arbitration any controversy arising
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable. )
(emphasis added).
151. See generally Ann E. Krasuski, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Agree-
ments Do Not Belong in Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8 DEPAUL J.
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often results in partiality shown towards the business on the part of the arbi-
trator153 and is consequently a disadvantage to the nursing home resident.
B. Economics
The elimination of arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts also
makes economic sense. The avoidance of the costs associated with litigation
is often credited as one of the main purposes of arbitration; 154 however, this is
a misconception with practically no evidentiary basis.' 55 In fact, arbitration
often is more costly than litigation. 156 There are significant fees that must be
paid when parties arbitrate a dispute. 157 For instance, not only will the parties
have to pay for the arbitration process, including the filing fee or forum fee,
but they also must pay an hourly or daily rate to the arbitrator, resulting often-
times in "costs in excess of $1,000 a day."' 58 This is often an unthinkable
amount for those whose resources are already drained from the costs of pay-
ing for the nursing home to provide care for the resident in the first place.
C. Proposed Solution
At the national level, Congress should act quickly to pass the Fairness in
Nursing Home Arbitration Act. If this legislation were passed, it would solve
the problems facing most entering nursing home residents and restore their
rights to have any potential claims of inadequate care on the part of their
nursing homes heard in a court of law. However, the likelihood that this pro-
posed legislation will pass is unclear. Additionally, it may be a considerable
amount of time before Congress provides a definitive answer on the matter.
Therefore, it is necessary to take action at the state level to remedy this grave
injustice.
Missouri would be wise to resolve the disparity left by the Lawrence de-
cision and reconsider the state's current approach to arbitration provisions in
nursing home contracts. The Supreme Court of Missouri should take the next
opportunity that it gets to invalidate a long-term care contract's arbitration
provision on the basis of unconscionability and outlaw the use of such provi-
153. Id. It has also been noted that there is an "incentive" for arbitrators to "favor
the business entity in their decisions" because they need to preserve the relationship
with the business so that they continue to be used to preside over the arbitrations. Id.
154. See Russel Myles & Kelly Reese, Arbitration: Avoiding the Runaway Jury,
23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 129, 138 (1999) ("Arbitration is cheaper than litigation pri-
marily because it is quicker than litigation.").
155. See generally BENNETr, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that "there is little hard
evidence to prove that arbitration is necessarily faster or cheaper, on average, than
litigation").
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sions. Additionally, the Missouri legislature should find a statutory solution
by enacting legislation eliminating the use of pre-dispute binding arbitration
in nursing home admission contracts altogether.
Missouri should implement legislation similar to the statutes currently in
place in Illinois and Maryland. This could be done simply by amending
Section 435.350 to provide that arbitration in nursing home contracts is
invalid under all circumstances. The legislature could accomplish this by
modifying the provision to read as follows: "A written agreement to submit
any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract,
except contracts of insurance, contracts of adhesion, and nursing home ad-
mission contracts, to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising
between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable . . . ." If enacted,
this provision would render all pre-dispute binding arbitration provisions in
nursing home contracts unenforceable, thereby solving the problem plaguing
aggrieved nursing home residents and their families and allowing them to
bring their claims before a judge and jury.
V. CONCLUSION
As the law currently stands, Congress, many state legislatures, and the
judiciary favor nursing homes over the facilities' residents when confronted
with challenges to arbitration provisions; however, recent decisions have
seemingly tilted the scales of justice rightfully back to the side of the individ-
ual adversely affected by a nursing home's inadequate care. Attitudes toward
pre-dispute compulsory arbitration in nursing home contracts are changing at
the national level, and for those entering a nursing home this will prove to be
very beneficial. Congress should act quickly to pass the Fairness in Nursing
Home Arbitration Act, as it will restore the rights of people needing the assis-
tance of a long-term care provider to have claims of "substandard care" heard
by a court or jury.'so Additionally, the Supreme Court of Missouri's positions
in Lawrence and Ward serve as a light at the end of the dark and stressful
tunnel that Missouri's elderly citizens and their families face when making
the decision to enter a nursing home facility. Missouri should, however, go
one step further and enact legislation eliminating pre-dispute binding arbitra-
tion in nursing home contracts. If these actions were taken, the demise of
arbitration agreements in long-term care contracts would clear the way for
justice for those harmed by the shortcomings of their nursing homes by giv-
ing them a voice in a court of law.
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